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Alexis George YAI<OV, PlaIntiff
and Respondent,

v.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS,
Defendant and Appellant.

Sac. 7810.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Jan. 11, 1968.
As Modifictl on Denial of Rehearing
Feb. 8, 1968.

Proceeding for writ of mandate to annul
order of Board of Medical Examiners re~
yoking physician's license to practice medicine. The Superior Court, Sacramento
County, William A. White, J OJ granted the
writ, and the Board appealed. The Supreme Court, Tobriner, J" held that conduct of physician in furnishing amphetamine drugs, not to garner personal profit
but to treat patients for excessive weight,
did not exhibit such baseness, vileness
and depravity as to constitute moral tUl'pitnde that would justify revocation of
his license, even though doctor had been
convicted for fnrpishing dangerous drugs
without a prescription.

Judgment annulling Board's decision
and remanding proceedings for redetermination of penalty affirmed.
McComb,

J.,

dissented.

Opinion, Cal.App., 58 Cal.Rptr. 644,
vacated.

I. Mandamus

~172J

187(9)

In proceeding for writ of mandate to
annul order of Board of Medical Examiners
revoking physician's license to practice
medicine, trial court's duty is to undertake
independent review of evidence, and func~
tion of Supreme Court on appellate review
is solely to decide whether credible, competent evidence supports that court's judgment. \Vest's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5.
435

P.2d-35lj~

2. Mandamus ¢:;:>174, 187(9)

Board of Medical Examiners, which
neither requested special findings nor ob~
jected to generality of those rendered by
superior court in proceeding for writ of
mandate to annul order of Board revoking
physician's license to practice medicine,
waived any objection to findings based on
specificity, and Supreme Court on appeal
from order granting writ was required to
assume that finding of ultimate fact included finding of all probative facts necessary to sustain it. West's Ann.Code Civ.
Proc. §§ 634, 1094.5.
3. Mandamus

~187(9)

Supreme Court was required to sustain
decision of superior court granting writ of
mandate to annul order of Board of Medical
Examiners revoking physician's license to
practice medicine if it was supported by
credible, competent evidence. West's Ann.
Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5.
4. Appeal and Error €=l930(1)

In reviewing evidence, all conflicts
must be resolved in favor of respondent, and
all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold verdict if possible.
5. Appeal and Error ¢=::l996

When two or more inferences can be
reasonably deduced from facts, reviewing
court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of trial court.
6. Appeal and Error e->996

Rule that when two or more inferences
can be reasonably deduced from facts, reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of trial court
is as applicable in reviewing findings of
judge as it is when considering jury's verdict.
7. Physicians and Surgeons e->11(2)

Not every violation of criminal1aw constitutes act of moral turpitude. West's
Ann.Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2383.
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8. Physicians and Surgeons ¢;:;:)11(3)

ana \ViIbur B. Thayer, Deputy Attys. Gen"

Purpose of action seeking revocation
of doctor's certificate is not to punish
doctor but rather to protect public. West's
Ann.Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2383.

for defendant and appellant.
Miller, Ford & O'Neal and Charles J.
Miller, Sacramento, for plaintiff and
respondent.

9. Physicians and Surgeons ~11(3)

Board of Medical Examiners can seek
to achieve legitimate punitive purpose only
through criminal prosecution.
10. Mandamus <$=>168(4)

Record in mandamus proceeding to
annul order of Board of Medical Examiners
revoking physician's license to practice
medicine supported conclusion of superior
court that physician involved did not prescribe drugs for personal profit motive and
that his personal motivation was benign
rather than evil. West's Ann.Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 4227; West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. §

TO BRINER, Justice.
Subsequent to Dr. Yakov's conviction on
nine counts of violation of section 4227 of
the Business and Professions Code (furnishing dangerous drugs without a prescription),
the Board of Medical Examiners filed a
statement of charges, alleging inter alia
that the doctor was guilty of conduct involving moral turpitude. After a hearing
in which the doctor represented himself,
the .board adopted the hearing officer's
proposed decision revoking Dr. Yakov's
medical certificate.

1094.5.
Dr. Yakov then petitioned the Superior
II. Appeal and Error <$=>842(1)

Determination of whether or not certain
conduct involves moral turpitude is question of law in sense that it should be decided by appellate court.
12. Appeal and Error

~42(7)

Ultimate conclusion to be drawn from
undisputed facts is question of law for
appellate court.
13. Physicians and Surgeons ~11(2)

Conduct of physician in furnishing amphetamine drugs, not to garner personal profit but to treat patients for
excessive weight, did not exhibit such
baseness, vileness and depravity as to constitnte moral tnrpitude that would justify

revocation of his license, even though doctor had been convicted for ;furnishing
dangerous drugs without a prescription.
West's Ann.Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 2384, 2391.5, 4211, 4227.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., E. G.
Funke, Asst. Atty. Gen" Hubert O. Bower

Court of Sacramento County for a writ of
mandate under section 1094.5 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. That court concluded that
the finding of moral turpitude was not
sustained by the weight of the evidence.
Because of the impossibility of determining the extent to which 'the board's finding
of moral turpitude contributed to its decision, the trial judge annulled the order,
remanding the, cause to the board for redetermination of the penalty.
[1] On the board's appeal to this court,
the question centers on the propriety of the
trial court' 5 holding that the weight of
the evidence does not support a finding of
moral turpitude. As we shall' explain, in
this type of case the trial court's duty is
to undertake an independent review of the
evidence; our function on appellate review
is solely to decide whether credible, competent evidence supports that court's judgment. Since the record contains facts
which sustain the decision that the doctor's
conduct did not involve moral turpitude, we
must affirm.
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On June 12, 1963, Virginia Duran, a
state agent posing as a patient, went to

Dr. Yakov's office for treatment and purchased a supply of amphetamine sufficient
for two months' weight control treatment.
Acceding to agent Duran's repeated requests, Dr. Yakov also sold her a fourmonth supply on June 19, a five-month
month supply on Junc 25, an eleven-month
supply on July 2, and a fifteen-month
supply on July 10. Dr. Yakov sold to
Jcannie Moffat, also a state agent under
orders to pose as a patient and attempt to
induce the doctor to sell her large quantities
of weight reducing pills, a three-month
supply of amphetamine on May 16, 1963, a
two-month supply on June S, a three-month
supply on June 12, and a ten-month supply
on June 26. On July 10, Dr. Yakov sold a
six-month supply to Alice Orr, also in the
employ of the state. 1

sponded that, pursuant to his general practice, he gave all of them a physical examination. Moreover, several of his pa~
tients testified that the doctor had always
examined them before prescribing pills.
The doctor conceded, however, that Moffat
had asked for, and been given, pills for two
of her friends whom he had not examined.

Admitting these facts, Dr. Yakov testified that at no other time had he ever
sold a patient more than a one-month
supply of amphetamine. About 500 of his
patients signed a statement to the effect
that none had ever received more than a
one-month supply. Although the board apparently attempted to find a regular patient
of Dr. Yakov who would testify to the
contrary, nonc was produced at the hearing.

Dr. Yakov testified that the pills which he
dispensed were no more dangerous than
coffee or Coca Cola. Citing a reference
work to the effect that amphetamine is not
habit-forming, the doctor attested that his
patients could stop taking the pills at will.
Several of his patients testified to cessation
of the use of the pills for extended periods of time. The strongest evidence to
the contrary consisted of a statement by a
chemist agent with the Bureau of Narcotics
Enforcement that, although amphetamine
was not narcotic, it was habit-forming in
the same sense as cigarettes.
Dr. Yakov testified that he practiced in a
neighborhood of poor people, devoted his
life to the underprivileged, and had never
sent a bill to a patient. Explaining that
he began to sell these weight-reducing drugs
only when his patients complained of the
high drugstore charge, he stated that he
sold the pills at one-half that price. Some
patients testified that the charges for Dr.
Yakov's services, including the pills,
amounted to substantially less than those of
other doctors.

The three state agents testified that,
although Dr. Yakov sometimes weighed
them, he did not take their blood pressure
or otherwise examine them. Dr. Yakov re-

[2] On this evidence the superior court
rejected, as not sustained by the weight
of the evidence, the medical board's finding of moral turpitude. 2 The court's opil1-

I. The sales to tllCse three agcnts, in ad-

dition to gencrating this license revocation proceeding, served as the ground
for the successful prosecution of Dr.
Yakov under section 4227 of the Business and Professions Code. That section provides: "No person shan furnish any dangerous drug >I< >I< >I< except upon the presoription of n physician, dentist, podintrist or veterinarian."
(Italics added.) Amphetnmilles arc classified as dangerous drugs by section
4211, subdivision (c), of the Business

and Profc!>sions Code. The prosecution
under section 4227 apparently proceeded
on the basis that, even though Dr. Yakov
was a medical doctor, he engaged in selling pills commercially rather than "prescribing" them within the meaning of the
statutory exception.
2. The court rendered the following find~
ings regarding the findings of the board:
"nl. The finding that Petitioner was
guilty of moral turpitude is not sup~
ported by the weight of the evidence..
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ion stated: "Petitioner has engaged in the
practice of medicine of medicine [sic] for
twenty-six (26) years, during which period of time he has had no disciplinary action or complaints against him. He minimizes in his own mind the theory that
the drugs he dispensed were 'dangerous',
comparing them to coffee, coco [sic] cola,
etc. The record fal1s short of showing a
profit motive in Petitioner's conduct-and
there is much credence to Petitioner's contention that his conduct was prompted by
affirmative action of Respondent's agents.
Not a single instance of any violation is
shown except those mentioned."

tled rule of Moran v. State Board of
Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301.

tdal comt." (32 Cal.2d at 308. 196 P.2d at
25.) Since its inception in 1948. the Moran
rule has been consistently applied to de-

196 P.2d 20, requires tiS to sustain the trial
court's decision if it is supported by credible,

scribe the scope of review of decisions not
only by the Board of Medical Examiners 3

[3]

In reviewing this matter, the set-

IV. To the extent that the finding:;;; with
respect to extelluation or mitigation are
based upon the finding that petitioner
was guilty of moral turpitude, such findings likewise arc not supported by the
evidence. V. This Court cannot ascertain from the record whether the same
penalty would have been imposed had the
Respondent recognized the absence of
evidence sufficient to support the finding that Petitioner was guilty of moral
turpitude and (to the extent set forth
in Finding IV above) the findings with
respect to extenuation and mitigation."
(

competent evidence. In Moran, the Board
of Medical Examiners, having found the
doctor to be guilty of unprofessional conduct for prescribing narcotics, suspended
his medical certificate for a year. Upon
review of the board's order, the superior
court, solely on the basis of the evidence
introduced before the board, rendered factual findings in favor of petitioner and ordered the decision annulled. Affirming
the judgment of the superior court, this
court held that the trial court was "au_
thorized by law to exercise its independent
judgment on the evidence" and that "the
ultimate power of decision rests with the

Although more :;;;pecific findings would
clearly have been preferable, the board
neither requested special findings nor
'Objected to the generality of tlIo:;;;e rendered. Under these circumstunces the
board waived any objection based upon
specificity, and this court must assume
that a finding of ultimate fact includes
a finding of aU probative facts necessary to sustain it (Code Civ.Proc. § <334;
Roppert v. Jackson (1963) 212 Ca1.App.
2d 678, 683, 28 Cal.Rptr. 467; Corrigan v. Stiltz (lD05) 233 Cal.App.2d
381, 384, 43 Cal.Rptr. 548).
Since the findings, though general, suf·
fice to show that the court passed upon
the central issue in dispute, the instant
situation is distinguishable from AlmadenSanta Clara Vineyards v. Paul (1006)
239 Cul.App.2d 860, 49 CuI.Rpt,. 256.
There the Court of Appeal hcld that the

trial court "made no fuetual detcrminu·
tion thut would settle the disputc and
did not decide Olle way or the other
whether Almaden paid Vogel in full."
(P. 867, 49 Cal.Rptr. p. 262.) The validity of the suspension of Almaden's license turned on that issne. Au inspec·
tion of the record there convinced the
appellate court thHt "it was the purpose and intent of the [trial] court not
to puss upon the vivotal i.~:sue in thc
case." (P. 808, 49 Cal.Rptr. p. 263.)
In the instant case the trial court did
pass upon the ph'otal issue of moral
turpitude; thc record confirms that it
did so, and the court's opinion sets
forth its reasons for concluding against
the doctOI"S guilt of moral turpitude.
Thus. the hohling in Tringham Y. State
Board of Education (1958) 50 Cal.2d
507, G08, 326 P.2d 850, 851, a case
illVolviIlg the revocation of teaching
credentials, applies here: "The rccord
shows that the COUI·t excrcised its inde·
pendent judgment on the evidence ana
determined that the board's order was
not supported by the weight of the evidence."
3. Sec Cooper v. State Board of Medical
Examiners (1950) 85 Ca1.2d 242, 24G,
217 P.2d 630, 18 A.L.R.2d 593; Whitlo\v
v. Board of Medical Examiners (1967)
248 A.C.A. 595, 601, 56 Cal.H.Ptr. 525;
Morris v. Board of Medical Examiners
(1904) 230 CuI.App.2<l 704, 711, 41 Cal.
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but also by other statewide administrative
agencies that arc without constitutional authority to exercise judicial powcrs.4
[4-6] As we stated in Moran, supra, 32
Cal.2d 301, 308, 196 P.2d 20, 25, quoting
from Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co.
(1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429, 45 1'.2d 183:
" '''In reviewing the evidence * * *
all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the
respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold the
verdict if possible. * * * When two or
morc inferences can be reasonably deduced
from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for
those of the trial court."'" HThe rule
quoted is as applicable in reviewing the
findings of a judge as it is when considering a jury's verdict." (Estate of Bristol
(1943) 23 Ca1.2d 221, 223, 143 P.2d 689, 690;
Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners,
supra, 32 Cal.2d 301, 308, 196 P.2d 20.)
Thus, pursuant to Moran, the question before this court turns upon whether the evidence reveals substantial support, contradicted or uncontradicted, for the trial
court's conclusion that the weight of the
Rptr. 351, 12 A.L.R.3d 1201; Sunseri
v. Board of Medical Examiners (1964)
224 Cal.App.2d 309, 313, 36 Ca1.Rp!"r.
553: Bernstein v. Board of Medical Examiners (19(32) 204 Cul.App.2d 378, 385,
22 CaI.Rptr. 419. Of course the justification for the de novo review by the
trial court estahlished by Moran is particularly strong where, as in the present
case, the various proceetlings \vill determine so vital a qUestion as a doctor's
right to practice his profession (cf.
Bernstein v_ Boaru of Medical Examiners, supra, 204 Cal.App.2d 378, 385, 22
Cal.Rptr. 419).
4. Sec, e. g., Nardoni v. McConnell (1057)
48 Ca1.2d 500, 503, 310 P.2d 644 (Insurance Commissioner) ;
Almaden-Snntn
Clar.'!. Vineyards v. Paul, supra, 239 Cal.
App.2d 860, 866, 40 Cal.RI)tr. 256 (Director of Agriculture); Caro v. Savage
(1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 530, 538, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 286 (Renl Estate Commissioner); Maywood Glass Co. v_ ,Stewart

(1959) 170 Ool.App.2d 719, 723, 339 P.
2d 947 (Unemployment Insurance Ap-

evidence does not show Dr. Yakov to be
guilty of conduct involving moral turpitude.

[7-9] Vle recognize that juristic definitions of moral turpitude have been general.
For example, this court has defined moral
turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness
or depravity ill the private and social duties
which a man owes to his fellow men or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. * * *" (In re
Boyd (1957) 48 Cal.2d 69, 70, 307 P.2d
625.) G Other than specifying that conduct
involving fraud, perjury, and intentional
dishonesty for personal gain falls within
these broad definitions (Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 65 Ca1.2d
447, 459, 55 Ca1.Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76; In
re Hallinan (1954) 43 Ca1.2d 243, 247, 272
P.2d 768), the courts have not narrowed the
inquiry by promulgating more specific definitions. Accordingly, we must focus on the
general question whether the totality of the
facts as found by the trial court, which
we must accept under Moran, indicates
such disregard by Dr. Yakov for the welpeals Board); Beach v_ Contractors
State License Board (1957) 151 Cal.
App.2d 117, 120, 311 P.2d 51 (Contractors State Liccnse Board); Ashdown
v. State of California Department of
Emplo.ymcnt (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 291,
299, 287 P.2d 176 (Department of Employment) ; see, Kleps, Certiorarified
Mandamus Revie,ved (1960) 12 Stan.L.
Rev. 554_

5. Not every violation of the criminal law
constitutes nn act of moral turpitude.
(In re Disbarment of Rothrock (1940) 16
0"1.2<1 '149. 454. lOG P.2d 907, 131
A.L.R. 226; Hallinan v. Committee of
Bar Examiners (1006) 65 Cal.2d 447,
459, 55 Cal.Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 7G.)
Indeed, section 2383 of the Business
and Professions Code neccssnrHy as~
sumes this conclusion by authorizing the
medical board to examine the eir(;Ulllstances of the erime in order to determine whether it involves moral turpitude.
The furnishing of dungerous drugs without n presctiption mayor may not be an
act of morul turpitude, depending on the
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fare of his patients as to demonstrate,
ubaseness J vileness or depravity." «I
[10] The record supports the trial
court's conclusion that Dr. Yakov did not
prescribe the drugs for a personal profit
motive; that his personal motivation was
benign rather than evil. The motivation of
the doctor c"rucially affects any finding
of his moral turpitude. Thus in Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners,
supra, 65 Ca1.2d 447, 461, 55 Cal.Rptr.
228, 239, 421 P.2d 76, 87, this court held
that whether Hactivities involve moral
turpitud€.! is dependent upon the * * *
motivation of the violator." We shall
point out in more detail the elements of
Dr. Yakov's motivation.
Both Dr. Yakov and his patients testified
to the fact that he sought to assist them
through the practice of selling pills at
amounts substantially below the drugstore
price. The board failed to introduce any
evidence that the doctor 'enjoyed an inordi·
nate, or indeed any, profit from his sales
at the lower price. The board did not
circumstances. On an issue closely re~
lated to the instant question, this court
has held that the offense of furnishing
an alcoholic beverage to a person under
the nge of 21 does not always involve
moral turpitude. (Lorenz v. Board of
Medical Examiners (1956) 46 Ca1.2d 084,
687, 298 P.2d 537.)
6. The purpose of an action seeking revo~
cation of a doctor's certificate is not to
punish the doctor but rather to protect
the public. (Cf. In re Disbarment of
Rothrock, supra, 16 CaJ.2d 449, 454, 106
P.2d 907 (disbarment): Hallinan v.
Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 65
CaI.2d 447, 462, 55 Cal.Rptr. .Q28, 421
P.2d 76 (certification for admission to
the bar).) While revocation of a certifi~
cate certainly works an unavoidable puni~
tive effect, the board can seek to achieve
a legitimate punitive purpose on1y
through criminal prosecution. Thus, in
this proceeding the inquiry must be lim~
ited to the e.ffect of Dr. Yakov's actions
upon the quality of his se.rvice to his
patients.
7. The determination of wllether or not
certain conduct involvcs "moral turpi·

prove, or attempt to show, that the doctor's
motive was evil.
Dr. Yakov's testimony reveals that, at·
though he recognized potential danger from
any drug used incorrectly, he considered
amphetamine no more dangerous or habit·
forming than coffee or Coca Cola. Even
assuming a lack of sound medical judgment
in Dr. Yakov's appraisal of the physical
consequences of the pills. we find no evi·
dence of subjective intent other than to
serve the best interests of his patients. He
testified. as did many of his patients, that
the pills successfully brought about weight
reduction.

[11-13] Dr. Yakov's sale of the pills to
Moffat for her friends without examining
the possible recipients, as well as his sale to
Duran of several months' supply at weekly
intervals, could sufficiently support a finding of unprofessional conduct under section
2391.5 of the Business and Professions
Code. Viewing the facts, as required by
Moran, in support of the trial court, however, we hold as a matter of law 7
tude" is a "question of law" in the sense
that it should be decided by an appellate
court. (In re McAllister (1939) 14 Cal.
2d 602, 604, 95 P.2d 932; In re Clark
(1959) 52 CaI.2d 322. 328-329, 340
P.2d 613; Otash v. Bureau of Private
Investigators (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d
568, 571, 41 Ca1.Rptr. 263.) This rule
merely exemplifies the generally accepted
proposition that the ultimate conclusion
to be drawn from undisputed facts is a
question of law for an appellate court.
(San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v.
San Diego County (1940) 16 Ca1.2d 142,
153. 105 P.2d 94, 133 A.L.R. 416;
Sonthern Pacific Co. v. Pillsbury (1915)
170 Cal. 782, 783-784, 151 P. 277.
L.R.A.I016E, 916: Brown. Fact and
Law in Judicial R('view (1943) 56 Harv.
L.Rev. 899, 901; Stern, Review of Findings of Administl'ators, Judges and Ju·
des: .A Comparative Analysis (1944)
58 Harv.L.Rev. 70, 112, 117.) Thus.
once the "facts" are established pursu~
ant to the Moran rule, this court must
reach an independent decision as to
whether Dr. Yakov's conduct demonstrated moral turpitude.
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that the doctor's conduct did not exhibit
such "baseness, vileness and depravity" as
to constitute moral turpitude.
In summary, the doctor's furnishing of
amphetamine drugs, motivated not to garner a personal profit but rather to treat patients for excessive weight, hardly reached
the sinister sphere of moral turpitude. This
record does not support a reversal of the
trial court's judgment, freighted as it is
with the presumption of propriety and
weight that such a ruling carries in this
kind of litigation.
The right to practice one's profession is
sufficiently precious to surround it with a
panoply of legal protection. Perhaps onc
rationalization for Moran lies in its prophylactic requirement that in the instant situation the appellate court must accept the
facts as found by the trial court, a judicial
tribunal, rather than by the disciplinary
board, an administrative agency. Following that precept we cannot sustain this
revocation of a license to practice medicine
based upon claimed moral turpitude.

The trial court's judgment annulling the
board's decision and remanding the proceedings for redetermination of the penalty
is affirmed.
PETERS, BURKE, SULLIVAN and
PEEK,concur.

n.,
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CONCURRING OPINION
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice.
My views with respect to judicial revic.v
of administrative findings of fact undet
Code of Civil Procedure, section 1094.5, are
set forth in dissenting opinions in Moran v.
State Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal.
2d 301, 315, 196 P.2d 20, and Southern
California Jockey Club, Inc. v. California
Horse Racing Board, 36 Ca1.2d 167, 178,
223 P .2d 1. These views remain unchanged,
but since a majority of the court adhere to
the Atloran case, I concur in the judgment
under the compulsion of that case.
DISSENTING OPINION
McCOMB, Justice.
I dissent. I would reverse the judgment
with directions to the trial court to discharge the alternative writ and deny the
petition for a writ of mandate for the
reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Bray in
the opinion prepared by him for the Court
of Appeal in Yakov v. Board of Medical
Examiners (Ca1.App.) 58 Ca1.Rptr. 644.
Rehearing denied; PEEK, J., sitting pro
tern. in place of MOSK, J.; McCOMB, J.,
dissenting.

• Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of
the Judicial Council

